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I. Introduction and Relevance
Throughout mainstream economic development literature and, in
particular, the analysis of international trade performance,
references to the importance of allowing factor prices in a
given land to reflect the relative scarcity of its factors of
production abound. The consequences for developing countries
(DCs) of specialization in the production of goods using more
of the factors of production, with which they are better
endowed, are stated to be a more efficient economy, which
provides the basis for faster growth and a higher degree of
competitiveness in world markets. That is to say, in countries
with highly distorted factor (and product) markets economic
development will be hampered or rather the degree of competi-
tiveness in world markets will be negatively influenced.
Notwithstanding the fundamental implications of the impact of
domestic market distortions on performance in world trade for
development policy recommendations, Krueger (1984, p. 555)
notes that "relatively little empirical work has been under-
taken to estimate their magnitude or their affects". It is the
latter aspect which is dealt with in this paper, namely the
impact of distortions on the performance of countries in world
trade with particular reference paid to Pacific Rim (PACRIM)
Countries. Specifically, it intends to yield evidence on the
relevance of ensuring that, in particular, domestic factor
markets are relatively free from those influences (i.e. policy
measures) which cause production to be shifted out of areas of
comparative advantage.
This problem is approached in a reversed fashion; i.e. first
the evidence on performance is reviewed before prevailing
policy measures are touched upon with respect to their hypo-
thesized impact on the factor intensity of production. The
paper begins by presenting a brief review of theoretical and
quantitative issues in connection with trade performance and
distortions. In this context quantitative evidence on the
interrelations between economic performance and distortions is
presented, thereby lending credence to the approach taken and
serving as a starting point for the analysis. It then places- 2 -
the trade performance of Pacific Rim countries versus other
developing countries into a perspective to allow performance
and distortion indicators to be quickly compared throughout the
remainder of the analysis. Based on this performance ranking
the paper proceeds to examine the general impact of industria-
lization policies as reflected in the factor intensity of
exports, realizing that overall policies, which caused one
factor of production to be relatively cheaper than another,
will tend to lead to an allocation of resources into industries
using the cheaper factor more intensively. In structuring an
indicator of export factor intensity, evidence is presented on
the reliability of indigenous vs. numeraire factor intensity
indicators and of changes therein over time. Chapter IV then
deals with export performance and the specifics of industria-
lization policies as incorporated in their impact on labor and
capital markets, not forgetting thereby the importance of the
domestic/foreign market interface. The paper concludes with
comments on the structuring of efficient industrialization
policies.- 3 -
II. Trade, Prices, the Structure of Production and Distortions
Was is not Sir Arthur Lewis who noted that Jamaica could solve
its development problems if it could only hook up to world:
trade in manufactures growing at a rate of 10% per annum? And
what kept it from doing so Or rather why did the Pacific Rim
Countries - as shown above - perform so well in export markets?
Mainstream international trade theory roughly tells us, that
specialization in the manufacturing of a product which uses the:
factors of production in a given country in line with their
relative factor endowment (reflected in the relative factor
prices), ensures that efficiency conditions prevail. While the
theory does not allow explicit conclusions to be drawn about
the relative performance of products manufactured in such a
manner in world markets, it seems congruent to deduce that -••
over a longer period of time and for a wider spectrum of
products - in those cases where relative prices are less
distorted, export performance will tend to be better than in
those cases where distortions abound.
The logic behind this conclusion is based on the dominant role-
played by prices in market-oriented economies. They not only
determine the demand for and supply of labor/capital (i.e. in
factor markets) they also signal to entrepreneurs where gaps
between supply and demand exist or are developing (i.e. in
product markets). Entrepreneurs, in reacting to such market
signals (e.g. increasing prices) do so because of the existence
of economic incentives in the form of profits from additional
or new production. Being able to correctly perceive where
imbalances are occurring and likewise being able to efficiently
tap the factor market, resources will be utilized in a manner
which yields the highest return for a given country. Given
flexible entrepreneurs as well as an efficiently functioning
interfacing between the domestic and foreign sectors the size
of the market which can be tapped and hence the possible gains,
which can be reaped by doing so, increase.- 4 -
While the existence of economic incentives alone is not neces-
sarily a sufficient condition to induce an economy to move
faster down the road of economic development, their crucial
role has become well documented ever since it was duly appre-
ciated in the mid sixties. Since then, a wealth of systematic-
ally collected data and information on development strategies
from a wide range of countries has been gathered and analyzed
(see Hiemenz, Langhammer (1986) for an overview). In essence
these studies present a clear picture of the positive impact
that competition has in ensuring an efficient allocation of
resources. Thereby it was usually determined that competition
with foreign counterparts tended to serve the function of an
acid test for the economic viability of ongoing businesses.
This being the case the studies - quite congruently - point to
the importance of reducing or eliminating protection, at least
to the extent that infant industry arguments are not deemed
relevant, in order to remain or become competitive.
However, becoming competitive vis-a-vis foreign counterparts
not only means being placed on the same footing with foreign
counterparts as concerns access to primary and intermediary
inputs at world market prices, as well as to the necessary
domestic/foreign financial facilities. It also embodies eli-
minating all those measures which impact directly on the prices
of the factors of production or indirectly on the production
process through the economic environment . In Krueger's 1983
synthesis of analyses carried out on 15 countries, the impact
of various policies on the relative price of labor to capital
is neatly summarized (see Table 7.1). In all those countries
with specific policies, labor to capital price ratios were in-
In Krueger's (1977) seminal essay on growth, trade and
distortions, which served as an analytical framework for a 15
country NBER sponsored project on trade and employment
(Krueger, 1983, p. ix-x) the ramifications and weakness of
mainstream international trade theory in connection with
distortions are aptly described. In up-dating this essay in
1984 she is able to chaw on numerous new specifications, but
still concludes the section on the trade impact of distor-
tions as noted at the outset. For a more recent attempt,
albeit without specifically dealing with distortions, see
Kotlikoff, Learner (1987).- 5 -
creased by 10% (Korea) to 316% (Pakistan). Hooking up these
(and other) distortions to their relative performance in world
trade was, however, not attempted.
Before dealing with the impact of these distortions, two
caveats seem necessary. First of all, since the entire spectrum
of distortions permeates all facets of the demand for supply of
labor and capital, a clear-cut identification and interpreta-
tion must give way to more cautious conclusions. Secondly,
aspects of more overriding nature, like shifts in demand or
changes in intercountry social preference differentials, may go
unnoticed and thus mask over or exaggerate underlying trends.
Regardless of theoretical considerations, the fundamental
question must be asked - given the lack of evidence as pointed
out by Krueger (see Introduction) - whether anything can really
be revealed at the high levels of aggregation. Perhaps distor-
tions in factor markets are themselves so strongly distorted by
other measures that treating them separately will produce but
little evidence on their impact. To attempt to engender some
initial evidence on the impact of the interconnections between
distortions and economic performance a pedestrian approach was
taken. This is based on data from 31 countries for the 1970*s
gathered for a World Bank research project (Agarwala, 1983)
dealing with price distortions in factor/product markets and
performance (i.e. growth rates) of the economy or sectors
therein. Out of this data set, distortions in connection with
the cost of labor, the cost of capital and the domestic-world
market interfacing (i.e. exchange rates) vis-a-vis economic
performance variables (i.e. GDP growth rate, growth rate of
industry and growth rate of real exports) were extracted and
are examined here . For each of the above areas, that is in
connection with the cost of labor, the cost of capital and ex-
Distortions also covered in Agarwala's paper included protec-
tion, agricultural pricing, pricing of infrastructural
services and inflation.- 6 -
change rates, for each country the distortion level was
classified as being low, medium or high. The economic perform-
ances (e.g. growth rate of GDP) for all those countries classi-
fied as having a given distortion level were then summed up to
produce an (unweighted) average performance figure (i.e. growth
rate) for a given distortion level.
These calculations are presented in Table 1. To be sure, the
evidence presented therein is quite straightforward as higher
economic performance (i.e. higher growth rates for GDP, indus-
trial production and exports) is seen to be correlated with
lower distortion levels. Most encouraging, however, is the
simple fact that this relationship is the strongest in the case
of export growth rates and distortions in labor markets: For
those countries with low distortion levels in labor markets
real exports grew at a rate of 6.5%/year, whereas for those
with high distortion levels in labor markets the rate of growth
was -0.3%/year. Without wanting to overinterpret or overem-
phasise these results, realizing the possible deficiencies
attached to constructing such distortion indices, but rather
merely assuming that the basic thrust revealed in the table
does indeed reflect real world happenings, then the evidence
seems like a reasonable starting point from which the analysis
can begin.
Beyond this, and just as important in a paper which deals with
LDCs
1 performance in export markets, is the fact that it is
precisely the correlation between labor market distortions and
export growth which proved to be the highest. In other words,
when distortions occur in the area where LDCs are assumed to
have their comparative advantage vis-a-vis ICs in producing
goods for world markets, export performance is negatively
influenced the most .
One would almost be inclined to say that "getting the prices
right" surely does seem to matter.- 7 -
Table 1 - Growth Rates of GDP, Industrial Production and
Exports vis-a-vis Distortion Levels in Labor (A),
Capital (B) and Exchange Rate Markets (C) - Evidence
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Source: Agarwala (1983), Tables 6, 8 and 10.- 8 -
In order to be able to directly interface export performance of
a set of countries with various distortions indicators for the
same set of countries, tables structured exactly along the
lines of Table 2 have been set up. Table 2 contains the base
information about the overall performance of 21 major DC
exporters of manufactures (as well as four industrialized
countries for comparison's sake) for the time period 1965-
1983 . Since the ranking of the countries in this table is
repeated in the tables capturing distortions throughout the
rest of paper, it is essential that the reader understands it
and is particularly aware of the following points:
- Manufacturing exports have been calculated using a concord-
ance between the standard international trade classification
(SITC - Rev. 1) and the international standard industrial
2
classification (ISIC) . They have been defined to encompass
all manufacturing industries (including food processing)
except petroleum refining (353) and products therefrom (354).
- The ranking of the industrializing countries is determined by
the value of manufacturing exports in the year 1983. To
portray the crucial performance aspect the ranking in 1965
(and specifically in Table 2 also in 1973) is included in ()
directly following the country name. The ranking of exports
by value in 1983 is distorted by some countries including
re-exports in their statistics (i.e. Hong Kong and Singapore)
For overall comparative purposes statistics on growth and
structure of world trade are included in Appendix Tables A2
and A3. Table A4 provides more detailed information on the
specific commodity performance of PACRIM countries vis-a-vis
other selected NICs. It is left up to the reader to verify
the spectrum of success which the PACRIM countries exhibited.
2
Concordance can be made available upon request._ Q _
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Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD.- 10 -
and by others not including exports produced or processed in
customs enclaves (i.e. Mexico) .
The method of ranking chosen reflects primarily the demands
of this analysis, it is not contended that all relevant
questions relating to exports are best represented by this
approach.
The exports for some countries had to be calculated via
inversions (e.g. the People's Republic of China), i.e. by
2
adding up the imports of partner countries . While the data
should be viewed as a rough estimate, they do seem to ade-
quately portray trends in the period under consideration .
These essential statistical issues having been clarified and
not wanting to delve any further into the data presented in
Table 2 for the moment, the analysis - using the format of
Table 2 - moves on to an intitial encounter with the overall
impact of the industrialization policy framework on trade.
Whereas the former would not necessarily influence the
evaluation of performance if re-exports shares remain con-
stant, the latter means that at least the 1983 figures
underestimate the actual value of exports.
While inversions do embody difficulties, it could be deter-
mined (by comparing inversions with data from countries where
correct data already existed) that the problems were not of a
nature to dismiss the information as useless.
3
For certain countries the 1983 (India and Malaysia) figures
were based on unofficial UN estimates. These estimates in the
past have proved to be relatively reliable.- 11 -
III. Trade Performance and the Factor Intensity of Trade:
Background and Measurement
Drawing on the above ranking of countries (and keeping in mind
the PACRIM trade trends/performance as shown on a more disag-
gregated level in Table A4), the question now to be addressed
concerns the overall impact of policies on trade or rather on
the factor intensity of exports. That is, to what extent can it
be established that the factor intensity of exports, as a
reflection of industrialization policies impacting on the
structure and factor intensity of production, followed a path
which could be deemed to be in line with assumed comparative
advantages of the individual countries.
This approach, which attempts to capture the impact of the
economic policy environment on the structure or rather on the
factor intensity of production and hence on the factor inten-
sity of exports, rests on the basic principle that resources
will flow into those industries where a more intensive use of
those factors of production is possible, from which a greater
return can be expected. To the extent that policies have been
instituted to promote certain industries or rather which affect
the allocation of resources flowing to these industries by
reducing the prices of the factors of production most inten-
sively used therein, then these sectors - ceteris paribus -
account for a greater share in production/exports. Hence,
referring back to Krueger's Table 7.1., which portrayed the
degree to which the ratio of prices for labor/capital were
affected by prevailing policies, the higher the value of this
ratio the greater the tendency of a country would be to produce
with higher capital intensive methods.
As far as the comparative advantage of the countries dealt with
in this paper is concerned, it is generally perceived to be all
the more in the area of labor-intensive goods, the lower the
level of per capita income was. While over time, i.e. as the
relative prices of the factors of production shift with in-
creasingly higher levels of development, more physical/human
capital-intensive lines of production will evolve, the speed- 12 -
with which this process occurs, depends - ceteris paribus
upon the speed with which income levels grow. In order to
determine the factor intensity of exports it is thus important
to find an indicator which is applicable to all countries on
the development ladder. In the past, most studies (see Ariff,
Hill, pp. 179-181) have been based on the assumption that data
from the United States on factor intensities of production
given the conditions in a large, relatively open market - can
be considered as sufficiently reflecting theoretically assumed
conditions and can hence be applied to other countries as well.
Lary's (1968) seminal work on this topic, where US, UK, Japan
and India factor intensity data are compared, is thereby used
as a basis or rather vindication for proceeding with US data.
These results not withstanding, but particularly in light of
the crucial nature of such an indicator which must correctly
reflect the factor intensity of trade over a wide spectrum of
development level, new calculations were carried out to gene-
rate an appropriate indication. This indicator, the construc-
tion of which is decribed in more detail in Appendix B, was
designed in line with theoretical underpinnings specifying that
- ceteris paribus - efficient development paths constitute
production employing relatively more labor than physical and
human capital at the early stages of development, shifting to a
more extensive use of the latter two as income levels increase.
Two indicators of factor intensities were used in this analy-
sis; one refers to physical capital intensity (CAPINT) and the
other to human capital intensity (HCINT).
FIXED. .





where for country i and industry j
FIXED.. = value of fixed assets,
EMP. . = employment and
WAGES. . = wages paidBibliothek
das Instihjts fur We'fwirfschaft
- 13 -
in the given year. These two indicators (based on US 1980 data
- see appendix) were then used to determine which ten 3-digit
ISIC industries had the lowest and the highest valves and thus
belonged to those which can be classified as being definitely
labor intensive (LI),
physical capital intensive (PCI),
low human capital intensive (LHCI) and
high human capital intensive (HHCI).
Having delineated these industries, their respective shares in
exports can be summed to produce the corresponding indicator.
Based on this indicator of definitely labor/capital intensive
or low/high human capital intensive exports, the development of
the factor intensity of exports can now be examined. That is,
for each of the 4 indicators (LI, PCI, LHCI and HHCI) first
export shares were aggregated for three subperiods within
1965-83 period and then their changes between the periods were
calculated. The results, which are assumed to reflect the
impact of the economic environment and policies therein on the
allocation of resources, are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
While the conclusions which can be drawn from the tables are by
no means unequivocal, there would seem to be enough evidence to
support the basic hypothesis that those developing countries
which tended to initially specialize in LI as opposed to PCI
industries faired better in world markets. This is most clearly
shown in the case of the two big losers over the 18 year
period, namely Egypt (which dropped 10 ranks) and India (which
dropped 8 ranks). Both of these countries exhibited noticeable
drops in the share of their exports in LI industries. On the
other hand, the most successful countries - i.e. Taiwan, Korea,
Singapore, Thailand and Turkey - all revealed initial increases
in their LI shares. Later on, those with already high LI shares
showed a decrease, as the relative prices of the production
factors shifted in accordance with income levels and supply
conditions. Those with still low levels of LI exports (e.g.- 14 -
Thailand and Indonesia) continued to expand their exports in
these areas.
Switching to the human capital side of the analysis, specific-
ally to the high human capital intensity indicator (HHCI), the
predominance of such goods in the exports of ICs is quite
visible (see Table 4, fourth column from right). That coun-
tries like Malaysia and Indonesia should register HHCI values
comparable to IC levels, however, has less to do with the
existence of extensive distortions, than with the natural
resource links of ISIC 372 (non-ferrous metals basic indus-
tries) . Aside from such outliers, the theoretical underpinn-
ings would tend to sketch a slow growth path of HHCI, dictated
- inter alia - by the rate of capital accumulation. Large
increases over short periods of time are thus likely to repre-
sent shifts into areas of production for which the economy is
not equipped to sustain. Within the first period (i.e. 1965-73)
those countries with the largest increases in HHCI (excepting
Tunisia) were also those with poor export performances. As a
matter of fact over the entire time period the largest in-
creases in HHCI - excepting Brazil - were exhibited by Egypt,
Argentina and India - the top three on the losers' list.
To conclude: Generally speaking, there does seem to have been a
tendency for countries which performed better in world trade to
have specialized in industries, where the factor intensity of
production was more in line with an efficient tapping of their
development potential.
See Ariff, Hill (Appendix II), where 372 is classified as a
resource intensive industry.Table 3 - Shifts
a in Export Shares in Industries with Definitely Low
c (LI) or Definitely High
Physical Capital Intensities
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Source: Own calculations based on foreign trade data from UNCTAD.Table 4 - Shifts
a in Export Shares in Industries with Definitely Low
c (LHCI) or Definitely High
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Source: Own calculations based on foreign trade data from UNCTAD.- 17 -
IV. Trade Performance, the Foreign/Domestic Market Interface
and the Factor Intensity of Trade: The Distortions
Without wanting to argue that the indicators chosen above have
correctly and completely picked up the policy measures which
influence them (this would mean ignoring exceptions) there does
seem to be enough interaction between factor intensities and
export performance to justify further investigation. But before
moving from export markets, i.e. export performance, to domes-
tic markets, i.e. to the policies impacting directly on the
allocation of resources within a country, the next step is
logically an examination of the interface between foreign and
domestic markets. After all, the most efficient domestic
policies will not engender success in export markets if the
foreign exchange system does not operate without friction and
if exchange rates do not correctly reflect the economy's
position in the international division of labor.
The Foreian/Domestic Market Interface: Exchange Rates and
Trade/Transactions Regulations
With respect to an exchange rate index (i.e. effective exchange
rate changes) these calculations illustrate one particular
factor influencing international competitiveness. It is thus an
essential link in interpreting developments in domestic markets
and comparing them with those in international markets. That
is, an exchange rate which - in real terms - is allowed to
appreciate by not adjusting for domestic price increases
relative to other countries, will make exportables less and
less competitive even if domestic factor markets have allowed
relative scarcities to be reflected in relative prices. Hence
performance in world trade will - ceteris paribus - be nega-
tively influenced. This can be best exemplified by drawing on
evidence from the diagram with the real effective exchange rate
changes (Diagram 1, see discussion in Fischer, Spinanger,
Appendix I) combined with export performance indicators (see
page 9). As noted above, since changes in real exchange rates
are but one factor affecting the ability to compete in world
markets the following caveats should thereby be observed:- 18 -
- Changes in real exchange rates only indicate a shift in the
competitive position of a country in world markets and do not
imply anything about the actual reaction of the country.
Hence a real devaluation, which improves the competitive
position, does not mean that competitive exports will be
automatically forthcoming. In other words producers must
react.
- Given the fact that producers must react to a change in their
competitive position, it takes time before the necessary
decisions are made and investments effected in order to
engender the products to be exported. To the extent that
production facilities and marketing channels already exist
such lead-time can be quite short. If new investments need be
effected, marketing channels established and other steps
taken, then the time frame can encompass several years.
- In the same vein real exchange rate changes will be all the
more effective in enducing shifts in production if the
changes are perceived as being of long enough duration so as
to reduce the risk of not receiving a fair return. In other
words, widely fluctuating real exchange rates dampen the
ability to predict the present value of a future stream of
earnings .
- Finally, changes in real exchange rates merely indicate size
and direction of shifts in the competitive position, they do
not imply that a country's exchange rate is at a level which
permits exporting competitive products. This means that the
changes have to enter or be within a range which would allow
efficiently produced exports to be competitively priced.
Tying this information to export performance is most easily
managed if additional information on distortions in the inter-
face is known. This is presented in Table A8 which attempts to
Recent trends in oil prices portray quite well what happens
if expected price increases, upon which investment decisions
are based, are not realized.- 19 -
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cover all possible barriers to interacting between domestic and
foreign markets.
While the information on distortions/barriers in Table A5 would
seem to show that the more successful countries did indeed make
it easier to access foreign markets (i.e. fewer dots for the
top countries than the bottom countries), the diagram on
effective real exchange rate changes - as noted above - is
difficult to interpret with respect to performance in world
trade. This is all the more so the better such an interface
functions, allowing the comparative advantages of a country to
be tapped, thereby driving up the exchange rate (in real
terms). Japan, for instance, experienced a large real revalua-
tion (exchange rate deflated with consumer prices) over the
years, but given rapid increases in productivity in the export
sector and restructuring, it has been able to cope with such a
trend (see Diagram 1 where exchange rates were deflated with
export prices) .
Distortions in Domestic Labor Markets
Within domestic markets the policies impacting on the relative
prices of labor and capital are for too numerous to be dealt
with in detail here. In the case of labor these cover all
measures which change the price in a manner which influences
the demand for and/or supply of labor. Basically speaking, in
market economies the remuneration of labor is supposed to
represent the pecuniary counterpart of labor services offered.
Although technically this still holds true, the remuneration
received directly by the person performing the services has
become an increasingly smaller share of total remuneration
directly and indirectly attributable to the employment of an
individual. Thus in discussing the implications of changes in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico are obviously influenced by
different parameters, namely the oil price. The extent to
which the government does not permit some sort compensation
for higher valued currencies, then exports in other sectors
may well suffer from the Dutch disease.- 21 -
relative prices between labor and capital it is quite essential
to use terms which cover the entire spectrum of costs generat-
ed. Labor costs therefore include as a main component wages,
but also non-wage costs dictated by government regulations,
agreements with unions, company policies and societal tradi-
tions. The non-wage costs coyer such items (e.g. social secu-
rity payments) which employees can see is being paid for them
and from which they assume they will receive benefits at some
future point in time. Included as well are those expenditures
required to allow a person to carry out a job he or she is to
be paid for, these being basically such items as required by
health and safety regulations enacted by the State but may also
be the result of bargaining agreements with unions .
Generally speaking the majority of the influences affecting the
cost of labor have been implemented in the course of creating
the modern Welfare State. They have caused the level and the
structure of real wages to inadequately reflect productivity
differentials between labor force cohorts and hence have made
2 it very expensive for firms to hire labor . In other cases they
have decreased interfirm as well as interregional mobility or -
in connection with other social/fiscal measures enacted by the
state - have made leisure more attractive than working .
These might be as minimal as safety glasses provided by
employers, but as extensive as elaborate workplace pollution
control devices which protect against poisonous gases, loud
noises and bright lights,
o
Minimum wages, for instance, establish wage floors below
which employers cannot legally pay. Thus if the value of the
output (i.e. productivity) of some persons is lower than what
is stipulated by minimum wages, then these persons will not
be employed. For an analysis of the impact of economy-wide
labor laws in a DC see Spinanger (1984 and 1986).
Such could be the case if unemployment insurance levels were
close to net earnings. If incentives did not exist to ensure
that the unemployed actively , sought new jobs, then paid
leisure could well result.Table 5 - Overview





































































































aThis table is an attempt to combine
problems exist between


























































































































































































wage rates, caution is necessary.
- The base in 1966 is in
base refers to hour (H) ,
also footnote c. The W after base
tables.
national currency units
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Source: Own calculations based on Starr (1981), World Bank (1984) and various national sources.- 23 -
A summary of wage and capital cost developments is given in
Table 5 . it must be remembered that labor costs need be viewed
in connection with the development of capital costs. Hence,
when discussing events in an inflationary world it is incorrect
- at least in the context of this analysis from the production
side - to discuss real wages deflated with consumer prices. The
relevant price index is the one which applies to the cost of
capital. This would be the price of capital goods as well as
the (real) interest rate.
Aside from pointing out that minimum wage legislation is
concentrated in the less successful countries, the relationship
between minimum wages/wage rates on the one hand and the price
of capital on the other hand illustrate policies practised in
various countries. In interpreting the results, however, it is
essential that information about other policies crucial to
tapping comparative advantages is taken into consideration
(e.g. exchange rate policies - see Table A5). Likewise infor-
mation on productivity levels is also necessary to fit the
trends into a picture which better reflects real developments.
That the PACRIM countries have been able to profit from their
ability to keep wages in line with productivity levels (i.e.
few distortions negatively influencing the demand for labor) is
quite evident in connection with the expansion of offshore
production facilities for the electronics industry. That is to
say: PACRIM countries were among the first to realize that
their comparative advantage in the manufacture of labor inten-
sive products could be tapped all the easier if other distor-
tions restricting the establishment of production facilities
were removed. They did so by opting for free economic activity
zones (FEAZs or export processing zones - EPZs), which are
supposed to represent relatively undistorted enclaves in an
otherwise distorted environment. That the PACRIM countries were
The table is based on incomplete information for wages, which
should actually be wage costs. Nonetheless it does give an
overview of relative trends which would probably not be too
much more different if such costs were included.Table 6 EPZs
a and Imports of Electronics Industry Products
Developing Countries, 1965-1983
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up of the following
including electronic
.3 statistical machines, including electronic machines
.9(2) parts of office machinery
.1 television broadcast receivers
.2 radio broadcast receivers
.9 telecommunications equipment, n.e
.3 thermionic, etc. valves and tubes
.9(5) electrical condensers and parts
.1 phonographs, tape and other sound






















































































































Source: Own calculations based on UNCTAD data.- 25 -
successful in offering their relatively undistorted labor
markets to producers of labor-intensive electronics products
can be seen in Table 8, which tracks the performance of 8 DCs,
thereby 6 from the PACRIM region, in exporting electronics
products to OECD countries. It shows that shifts in the shares
occurred in connection with the introduction of FEAZs .
Distortions in Domestic Capital Markets
As in the case of labor costs, the impact of factor market
distortions on the demand for and supply of capital as well as
the implications for export performance, can only be approached
in an eclectic manner. While it is true that information on a
wide spectrum of aspects - from interest rates and incentives
through depreciation allowances and tax rates - is readily
available, these measures are at best very rough indicators and
little information exists on their actual relevance or the
extent to which they applied. If this describes the general
state of affairs, the situation becomes increasingly difficult
when attempting to differentiate between industrialized and
industrializing countries and even more so when sectoral or
subsectoral disaggregations are attempted.
In making an attempt to estimate the cost of capital, a per
unit output formulation is in line with the analysis carried
out here (i.e. analogous to unit labor costs). The per unit
costs of capital are determined by the unit price of capital
and the degree of utilization of capital in the production
process. Since - as mentioned above - the unit price of capital
itself is influenced by a variety of factors (i.e. by exchange
rates, tariff rates, financial and fiscal subsidies as well as
by depreciation allowances) and these vary widely over coun-
tries and even industries within countries, relatively sound
data just at a highly aggregated level is hard to come by.
That other factors were involved (e.g. investment incentives)
is not denied by the other, but studies have shown that these
are secondary to advantages in unit labor cost.- 26 -
Analoguous to the discussion of labor market distortions, with
respect to relative costs of employing labor and capital, there
are three principal channels through which capital costs can be
affected by policies in the capital market. First, the trade
regime may be administered in ways that affect the relative
costs of capital equipment to different users. Second, there
may be interest rate subsidies and credit rationing that can
affect the relative costs of labor and capital to different
industries. Finally, the tax structure and special schemes for
depreciation allowances can effect the relative profitability
of labor-intensive and capital-intensive techniques. Although
there are always market imperfections due to information costs,
transaction costs and other frictions associated with the
process of economic growth, direct and indirect interventions
into capital markets have played a major role in developing
countries in comparison to industrialized economies. The
relevant question is whether there have been any significant
shifts in policies in the last twenty years thus systematically
influencing the price of capital and thereby factor proportions
between industries and countries, particularly with respect to
the PACRIM countries. Of course, only major policy measures can
be identified and correlated here to judge the direction in
which they might have influenced the relative use of capital
and labor in export activities. In turn, this could have been a
significant factor in determining international competitiveness
of products produced for the world market.
Especially under import substitution regimes which prevailed in
most of the developing countries up to the mid-sixties and
still are working in many of these economies, a variety of
mechanisms can be identified through which the foreign exchange
and trade regimes affect the overall capital cost relative to
labor cost and also the relative capital cost to different
industries. Perhaps the most important one is the use of a
different (and lower) exchange rate for imports of machinery
and equipment than for other imports (see Table A5). Very often
this arises in the context of currency overvaluation, when most
imports are subject to high tariff rates while capital goods- 27 -
imports enter on low rates of duty or even duty free. Although
it may be that import substitution tends to offset the higher
costs of production of those goods entailed by their compara-
tive disadvantage it nonetheless can constitute an implicit
subsidy both for capital-using industries and for the choice of
capital-intensive technique.
Little empirical work has been undertaken to estimate the
magnitude of capital market distortions or their influence on
capital used in production in developing countries. About the
only piece of relatively systematic evidence is from twelve
countries covered in the National Bureau Project on Alternative
Trade Strategies and Employment .
According to these studies exchange rate overvaluation, coupled
with the reluctance of policy-makers to tax imports of capital
goods in a similar fashion to that of other imported goods, has
been a significant factor in contributing to low capital costs
under import substitution regimes; the subsidy implicit in the
pricing of capital goods were estimated to be in the range of
30-40 p.c. For countries which fostered export promotion the
picture is different. Undervaluation of capital goods was
generally avoided by fairly realistically valued currencies.
While tax incentives for investment have evidently not played a
significant role for investment decisions within developing
countries (Galenson, 1984) either an overvalued exchange rate
or availability of credit at below-market borrowing rates
worked in the direction to induce lower capital costs and
provided together with rising labor costs (resulting mostly
from minimum wages and social legislation) strong incentives
for use of capital-intensive production which then resulted in
the above described factor intensities of exports.
A synthesis and conclusions of these studies can be found in
Krueger (1983).- 28 -
The per unit costs of capital can also be significantly affect-
ed by the degree of capital utilization. An increase in the
utilization of equipment in manufacturing in the form of longer
working hours per year and per unit of equipment may result
(among other factors) from better management and/or from
increased weekly hours attributable to additional shift work.
The decision of a firm to use shift work or otherwise to
lengthen its normal operating hours of capital depends on
certain microeconomic considerations as well as on certain
institutional and social factors. The greater the capital
intensity of production, for instance, the greater the incen-
tive to use shift work. Running extra shifts, however, may
extend increases in marginal costs, the most important of which
is labor, for which premiums are ordinarily paid for work on
second or third shifts. Shift work is encouraged when the price
of capital is high in relation to the price of labor, and the
use
;of it depends also on the ease with which capital can be
substituted for labor in response to a decline in the relative
price of capital. The PACRIM countries have been mentioned in
numerous studies, particularly in connection with the textile
industry complex, as the location, where high substitutability
exists and capital stock is subjected to few regulated down
times.
In Table 7 it is attempted to capture the macro-economic impact
of influences on the price of capital, i.e. the interest rate,
by looking at it in real terms. It can be expected that in
those countries where the real rates of interest are low or
rather negative, the tendency to use capital intensive produc-
tion methods will be higher. Furthermore, in such countries the
willingness to loan money (at negative real interest rates)
will also be low, so that economic/export performance will be
further hampered. While the picture which can be developed from
Table 7 is also not unequivocal, it does reveal that those
countries in the lower half of the table more often tended to
have negative interest rates than those in the top half. India,- 29 -
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Source: Fischer (1982); Hanson, Neal (1984); IMF (1984); Wai
(1972); Agarwal, Dippl, Langhammer (1985); Fischer
(1986); Various National Statistics.- 30 -
as one of the largest losers (-8 ranks) had large negative
interest rates; the same applies to the Philippines (-5 ranks)
and Pakistan (-4 ranks). On the other hand, Taiwan (+11 ranks)
and Korea (+17 ranks) were almost always positive and Brazil
(+0 ranks) effected a forceful turnabout from highly negative
rates in the 60's to highly positive in the early 80's. All in
all, given these data plus information on the myriad of capital
cost reducing policies it becomes difficult to believe that the
correlation in Table 1 between export performance and distor-
tions in capital markets is not stronger - even stronger than
for labor. It must be remembered, however, that although many
measures do make capital cheaper, the use of more capital-in-
tensive methods is not necessarily an efficient approach in
many of the countries in the sample. On the other hand, since
countries have introduced but few measures decreaing the cost
of labor, lower distortion levels here mean that labor can be
more efficiently employed. This in turn can lead to more
competitive position and hence to a better export performance.
V. Concluding Remarks
At the outset of the preceding four sections it was stated that
evidence was to be yielded on the interconnection between
distortions in factor markets and performance in world trade
particularly with respect to the PACRIM countries. While the
results presented above are not unequivocal in the sense that
indisputable facts have been presented for the entire sample of
countries, there was nonetheless general evidence that the
PACRIM countries either had fewer distortions or (not touched
here) intervened in a manner which still allowed the profit
motive to prevail. Comments to this effect can also be found in
Riedel's (1985) stimulating tour d'horizon through the Asian
economies as well as in UNCTAD (1987, p. 47).
Maybe the most effective way of underlying this with respect to
the performance the PACRIM countries in world trade is to
return to Table 2 and derive from it a table of winners and- 31 -
losers in world trade (i.e. a ranking of changes in the rank-
ings of the 21 countries over the time period 1965-1983; see
Table 8). Out of the winners
1 column it can be seen that 5 of
the 7 winners are from PACRIM. Furthermore, those countries
which did exceptionally well or exceptionally poor (i.e. the
first four in the winners' group and the last four in the
losers' group) exhibited an increase or a decrease in both
periods. In other words, they were consistent (but not con-
stant) in their performance. While Korea and Taiwan belong to
the often-quoted set of top performers, Turkey and Thailand do
not, but have slowly and continually moved up the ranks into
positions in the middle of the group. Should the growth rate
differential between these two countries and India remain the
same, they will have nudged out India in the rankings in the
course of 1986.
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Among the 8 losers appear 3 PACRIM countries: the Philippines,
the People's Republic of China and Malaysia. Whereas the
Philippines has been struggling for years to try to effectively
structure its policies and the People's Republic of China only
embarked on a major shift at the beginning of the 80"s, Malay-
sia is a country often placed otherwise among the winners. Its
relatively poor performance in the initial period was only
somewhat compensated for in the years following 1973. Without
going into details, it should be noted that the pattern reveal-
ed for Malaysia reflects quite well the course of economic
policies, as the slower growth rates in the latter part of the
1960s induced during the 70's policy-makers to shift strategies
to a less inward-looking import substituting stance. The change
in the framework of relative prices not only induced new
investments from within, the flow of foreign direct investments
also increased noticeably, particularly into labor-intensive
industries manufacturing non-traditional products (as mentioned
above in connection with EPZs).
For those countries in mid-field success implies maintaining
roughly the same ranking. In the case of Brazil this was
achieved by recovering the two ranks in the second period it
had lost in the initial period; a major shift in export in-
centive policies (particularly for non-traditional industries,
as can also be seen in Table 2) can be considered to be behind
these developments. Hong Kong, on the other hand, dropped down
one notch due to poorer performance in the second period,
hardly due to government industrialization policies (which it
did not have), but rather to reactions to the initial negotia-
tions on Hong Kong's future.
As compared with other studies, it can be stated that the
evidence presented above is based on a far wider spectrum of
countries and thus can place the performance of PACRIM coun-
tries in a correct international perspective. While information
gathered from individual country studies is obviously essential
to understand the internal workings of industrialization
policies, an Understanding of the important international- 33 -
implications with respect to other countries' performance in
world trade - and the underlying reasons therefor - are usually
lacking. In one of the most recent studies published on exports
of manufactures from the PACRIM countries (Krause [1987], pp.
209-210) the answer to the question, why PACRIM LDCs have been
relatively successful exporters, is given as follows:
"... first, the countries in the Pacific Basin have
grown faster than other countries; second, these LDCs
have had more outward-oriented economic policies than
other LDCs; and third, they had a ready market for
their exports in other Pacific Basin countries."
Needless to say, such generalities do not get down to the
parameters in factor markets laying the foundations for suc-
cessful export performance. Although this study has only
scratched the surface of this subject, the indicator set up to
measure the factor intensity of trade should help in further
analyzing issues involved .
Perhaps it is even fitting to end this paper with a straight-
forward and succinct example of how distortions in factor
markets really do work their way through to export performance.
One of those PACRIM countries on the winners' list, and long
upheld as a prime example of how to develop quickly and effi-
ciently with an open economy and relatively undistorted factor
markets, Singapore, clearly experienced the feedback of its own
policies, in particular "to go against the market". That is to
say, in 1979 the Government commenced policies to raise wages
faster than (average) productivity so as to squeeze out those
industries with low productivity levels . It was felt that such
Likewise, the information about the relevance of. using such
factor intensity indicators from an IC as opposed to DC makes
it easier to tap available data sources rather than having to
invest in extensive information costs.
This policy also included specific reductions in the use of
foreign laborers, since they were usually employed in the
highly labor-intensive industries.- 34 -
Table 9 - Singapore's Unit Labor Costs
a Relative to Asian


















































Source: Own calculations based on Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 27, 1986 and GATT (unpublished).
industries should not remain in the City-state, where high-tech
establishments were supposed to chart the future course of the
economy.
The above policy (along with other influences) resulted in a
rapid shift in relative unit labor costs to the disadvantage of
Singapore (see Table 9). Having worked their way through the
system the increased labor costs not only led to exports be-
coming less competitive, investment also fell off and GDP fell
in 1985 for the first time in over 20 years . Initial reactions
have been towards providing additional incentives and reducing
taxes/nonwage labor costs, thus it remains to be seen whether
Employment in construction and manufacturing suffered a
decrease of almost 20%. Together the two sectors account for
about one third of total employment in Singapore.- 35 -
more sweeping reforms will instill the degree of flexibility
into the system which Hong Kong still possess. Or rather
whether the productivity increases are forthcoming to the same
degree as in the case of Korea, which was even able to increase
its competitive position over time.
To summarize the above evidence on maintaining or improving a
competitive position in foreign trade means underlining the
importance of efficient industrialization policies, i.e.
allowing labor and capital to be paid relative to their abund-
ance in an economy. Ensuring that this can be easily effected
or rather actually representing a precondition to continued
success in world markets, is the flexibility of a given econo-
mic system. Particularly in light of recent major advances in
technology - which could well impact on the international
location of labor-intensive industries - is flexibility the key
to countering quickly changing parameters. Hong Kong is an
excellent example here, as entrepreneurs in the Crown Colony
are already employing state-of-the-art technology in the
clothing industry to remain competitive in ICs. Thus with
changes now occurring more rapidly now than in the past,
economies, which attempt to nail down certain wage relation-
ships or are intent on moving in one predetermined direction
without regard to relative factor endowments, will find their
economic well-being suffering, as world trade flows bypass
them. Thus, to come back to Arthur Lewis again, Jamaica might
have become the Hong Kong of the Caribbean Basin had it paid
more attention to such basic principles in the past. As no
evidence has been presented that such principles will not
prevail in the future, those PACRIM countries which waivered
from an efficient strategy in the past have every chance to
make good in the coming years. And the more countries that do
so, the greater the chances are that it will finally be rea-
lized that allowing economies to interact with impulses from
world markets, rather than shielding them from such influences,
increases competitiveness and thus the growth potential.A P P E N D I X A
TABLES- 36 -
Table Al - Growth Rates
a of Non-energy Exports from Industria-
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Republic of China as well as China, Taiwan are included.
Source: Based on UNCTAD data.- 37 -
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Source: Based on UNCTAD data.- 38 -
Table A3 - Growth Rates of Exports, GDP as well as Industrial Pro-
duction and Distortion Levels for Labor Markets, -Capital













































































































































































export growth rates. PACRIM












































































2. Korea, R. (19)
3. Brazil (3)
4. Singapore (6)
5. Hong Kong (4)
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Source: IMF- 40 -
APPEND IX B
Constructing a New Indicator of the Factor Intensity of Trade:
Background and Approach- 41 -
Constructing a New Indicator of the Factor Intensity of Trade:
Background and Approach
In order to construct an indicator of the factor intensity of
trade, applicable to all countries on the development ladder,
most studies (see Ariff, Hill, pp. 179-181) have drawn on US
data on factor intensities of production, assuming that in the
US a relatively open market prevailed and thus the conditions
were considered as sufficient to satisfy theoretical demands.
Lary's (1968) seminal work on this topic, where US, UK, Japan
and India factor intensity data are compared, is used as a basis
or rather vindication for proceeding with US data.
Wanting to make sure that the results in this paper are not
(possibly) distorted by calculations based on data which are
over a quarter of a century old, new calculations were carried
out. These were based on the factor intensities of 3-digit ISIC
industries for 5 PACRIM countries as well as the United States,
drawn from census (or survey) data from around 1970 and 1980 .
Statistics from two years for each country were specifically
used, so as to also be able to determine whether indicators
change significantly over time, that is, lose there ability to
capture developments in factor intensities over time, as might
be possible in the case of Lary's calculations.
In line with theoretical underpinnings specifying that - ceteris
paribus - efficient development paths constitute production
employing relatively more labor than physical and human capital
at the early stages of development, shifting to a more extensive
use of the latter two as income levels increase, two indicators
of factor intensities were used in this analysis; one refers to
physical capital intensity (CAPINT) and the other to human
capital intensity (HCINT).
Data were taken from the following years: USA - 1968 and 1980; Korea -
1973 and 1983; Malaysia - 1973 and 1981; the Philippines - 1972 and 1977;




(2) HCINT. . =
 3J"
where for country i and industry j
FIXED.. = value of fixed assets,
EMP.. = employment and
WAGES.. = wages paid
in the given year. A ranking of the 3-digit industries by the
indicators then provides an entire spectrum of factor inten-
sities. Thereby, in the case of CAPINT, the lowest values
would represent highly labor intensive industries and, analo-
gously, the highest values extremely capital intensive indus-
tries. In traditional studies the indicators of factor inten-
sities for each and every industry (either in value terms or
as an index number) are then weighted with foreign trade
and/or production shares to draw conclusion about the factor
intensity of trade and/or production.
The approach used in this paper differs somewhat from the
above and follows more along the lines of Ariff, Hill (1985,
chapter 5). It is furthermore based upon the realization that
there are industries whose specific delineation, e.g. as being
labor or capital intensive, is quite difficult. It was thus
decided to embody in an indicator reflecting factor intensi-
ties only those industries whose factor intensities could
be specified, e.g. being definitely labor intensive. In
reality this was effected by integrating the top or bottom ten
industries into an indicator. CAPINT, for example, when
incorporating the lowest ten values, becomes an indicator of
definitely labor intensive industries. When incorporating the
highest ten values, the indicator represents definitely
physical capital intensive industries. The same reasoning
applies to HCINT.- 43 -
Based on the data from five PACRIM countries plus the United
States (from around 1970 and 1980) those ten 3-digit ISIC
industries were determined for each country - using the above
method of calculation - which belonged to definitely
- labor intensive (LI)
- physical capital intensive (PCI)
- low human capital intensive (LHCI) and
- high human capital intensive (HHCI).
An overview of these industries for the six countries can be
found in Tables Bl to B4. It becomes evident from them that
over time, the composition of the individual sets changes
little. For instance, out of the 10 LI industries in the six
countries around 1970, 7-9 were still part of this group
around 1.980. Similar results can be found for the other sets.
Of more fundamental importance is the evidence on the degree
to which factor intensity indicators based on data from a
given country, i.e. usually the United States, can be applied
to other countries regardless of development level differ-
ences. This evidence, gained by contrasting the US with the
other countries in the sample, is distilled out of Tables
B1-B4. It shows (in Table B5a) that only slightly more than
half the industries of a US sample coincide on average with
the industries in a sample from one of the PACRIM countries.
It should be noted that the labor/physical capital intensity
indicators are in greater agreement than the human capital
intensity indicators. Important differences (i.e. as far as
exports are concerned) between the US and the other countries
can be seen particularly in the case of textiles (factor
reversal!) but also in food manufacturing.
All this evidence could be interpreted as pointing to the fact
that factor intensity indicators taken from an industrialized
country, even if it can be considered to be relatively open,
are not relevant for developing countries. In order to attempt- 44 -
to substantiate this proposition evidence on Singapore, being
a relatively undistorted economy, and Taiwan, having a broader
industrial structure, were distilled out of Tables B1-B4. The
results (see Tables B5b and B5c) do not substantiate the above
suspected irrelevance of IC indicators for DCs. As a matter of
fact, generally speaking, there would seem to be but little
difference, as an indicator based on the data of any one of
the countries would be as incomplete as a numeraire as one
based on data from another country. This being the case, there
would seem to be only one pressing reason to reject the numer-
aire based on US data, namely to use indicators of indigeneous
factor intensities. Since such data exist for only a select
number of countries, this suggestion can hardly be considered
relevant when dealing with a larger sample of countries. Thus
for the lack of a well-founded reason to switch to data from
another country, factor intensity indicators based on US data
will continue to be applied .
Indices based on factor intensities from the other PACRIM
countries have also been calculated and analysed, but cannot
be included in this paper due to space constraints. The main
differences they reveal are in the levels rather than in the
trend.- 45 -
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Table B2 - Classification of Definitely Physical Capital Intensive Industries (PCI) in
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Table B3 - Classification of Definitely Low Human Capital Intensive (LHCI) Industries in
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Table 34 - Classification of Definitely High Human Capital Intensive Industries (HHCI) in
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Table B5b - Factor Intensity Agreements'
Countries































































Table B5c - Factor Intensity Agreements
Countries








































































Source: Based on Tables B1-B4.- 50 -
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